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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4103(2)(e).
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v.

Courtney, District Court Case No. 131900508, on December 30, 2013 (R. 184-85;
attached at Addendum A). On December 1, 2014, the district court reinstated
Appellant Carl Courtney's time to file an appeal (R. 249), and a notice of appeal
was timely filed on December 26, 2014 (R. 254).
Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting Mr.

Courtney's 2012 drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show
intent.
Standard of Review: Appellate courts review a n trial court's decision to

admit evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard." State v. Lucero, 2014UT15,111, 328 P.3d 841 (quotation
omitted).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R. 280: 7-15.)
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Issue 2: Whether Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective (1) for not

objecting when the State offered the details of Mr. Courtney's 2012 conviction
under Rule 404(b); (2) for not objecting to the admission of a witness's Rule
404(b) evidence that she had seen Mr. Courtney sell drugs before; and (2) for
failing to subpoena an important witness.
Standard of Review:

11

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised

for the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for
correctness." Lucero, 2014UT15,111 (quotation omitted).
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. But an II exception to the

preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kozlov,
2012 UT App 114, iJ 35, 276 P.3d 1207.
Determinative Provisions

The following provisions and cases are set forth at Addendum B:
• Utah R. Evid. 404
• Utah Code§ 58-37-8
• Utah Code § 58-37a-5

2
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Statement of the Case

In August 2010, a police officer1 stopped Mr. Courtney while he was
looking for a child in a parking lot of an apartment complex. (R. 1; 280:109-10,
118.) Because Mr. Courtney appeared fidgety, the officer asked to search Mr.

Courtney, and he consented. (R. 280: 111.) The officer found on Mr. Courtney a
pocket knife, 60 small Ziploc baggies, and a piece of paper with names and dollar
amounts written on it (an "owe sheet"). (R. 280:111-12.) Mr. Courtney told the
officer that he carried the knife for protection, that the owe sheet was not his, and
that the baggies were for his coin collection. (R. 280:117-18.)
Believing that the items on Mr. Courtney were drug paraphernalia, the
officer placed Mr. Courtney under arrest and drove Mr. Courtney to his
girlfriend's apartment that was in the same complex as the parking lot. (R.
280:118-19.) Mr. Courtney requested that the officer take him to his girlfriend's2

1

Officer Don Johnson-the police officer that stopped, searched, and
arrested Mr. Courtney-was later charged with drug crimes of his own. See
"Former Utah narcotics officer charged with drug crimes," Salt Lake Tribune Oan.
27, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/ news/ 2107471-155 / former-utah-narcoticsofficer-charged-with.
2
Mr. Courtney's girlfriend dated Mr. Courtney from 2007 to 2010. (R.
280:183.) Even though at the time of trial Mr. Courtney was no longer dating his
girlfriend, for ease, she will be referred throughout this brief as Mr. Courtney's
girlfriend. Mr. Courtney dated his wife on and off for about 19 years, and they
married in 2013, right before Mr. Courtney's trial. (R. 281:35.)
3
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aparhnent because his daughter was staying at the apartment and he needed to
make arrangements to get his daughter to school. (R. 280:118-20.)
When the officer arrived at the girlfriend's aparhnent, Mr. Courtney
stayed in the police car while the officer approached the girlfriend. (R. 280:12021.) The girlfriend gave her consent for the police to search her car, which Mr.
Courtney had driven to her aparhnent that morning. (R. 280:120-21.) The officer
retrieved the keys to the car from the girlfriend. (R. 280:121-22.) Inside the car,
the police found a pouch that contained a needle and some methamphetamine.

(R. 280: 122-24.)
The State then charged Mr. Courtney with two counts: (1) Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, in violation of Utah Code § 58-378(1)(a)(iii), and (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code §
58-37a-5(1). (R. 1.)
Before trial began, Mr. Courtney's counsel did not file a request for notice
of Rule 404(b) evidence. However, the State filed a notice of 404(b) evidence on
its own accord, seeking to admit evidence of a crime Mr. Courtney committed
two years after the charged conduct in this case. (See R. 40-42; attached at
Addendum C.) Specifically, the State sought to admit evidence of a 2012
conviction, where, as part of a controlled buy, Mr. Courtney sold
methamphetamine to a confidential informant in a hotel room. (R. 41.) The State

4
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argued that Mr. Courtney's distribution of drugs on a subsequent occasion was
indicative of his intent to distribute drugs in this case. (R. 280:8-9.) The trial court
admitted evidence of the 2012 conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) for the
purpose of showing intent. (R. 280:14-15; attached at Addendum D.) But the
court stated that it was disinclined to admit the specific facts underlying that
conviction because the 2012 crime and the crime charged in this case were too
dissimilar. (R. 280:19-20.)
At trial, a witness for the State testified about the details underlying Mr.
Courtney's 2012 conviction. (R. 280:16; 281:20-23; attached at Addendum E.) Mr.
Courtney's counsel did not object to the admission of that evidence. (R. 281:2023.)

Also during trial, Mr. Courtney's girlfriend testified in the State's case-inchief. The State questioned her about Mr. Courtney's prior drug use and drug
distribution, and she testified that Mr. Courtney had used drugs in the past, had
sold her drugs, and had sold drugs to others for money. (R. 280:193-94; attached
at Addendum F.) Mr. Courtney's counsel never objected to the girlfriend's
testimony. (Id.)
During trial a police officer also testified that an owe sheet- like the one
found on Mr. Courtney-is typically used by drug dealers to keep track of what
is owed to them. (R. 280:111-12.) Mr. Courtney testified that the owe sheet was

5
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not his and was in fact Missy Amy's. (R. 281:55-57.) He testified that Ms. Amy
had loaned money to others, and Mr. Courtney was using the sheet to collect on
the debts owed to her. (Id.) Ms. Amy did not testify at the trial.
After deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Courtney on possession with
intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 184.) The trial court
sentenced Mr. Courtney to 1 to 15 years for possession with intent to distribute
and 0 to 6 months for possession with drug paraphernalia, with the sentences to
run concurrently. (R. 184-85.)
Summary of the Argument
Issue 1: The district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence

of Mr. Courtney's 2012 drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
The evidence was too prejudicial than probative because the 2012 drug
distribution conviction was not similar to the charged crimes and the time gap
between the two events was too great.
Issue 2: Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective by (1) not objecting to

a witness's testimony that described the details underlying Mr. Courtney's 2012
drug distribution conviction; (2) not requesting notice of 404(b) evidence and
then not objecting to the girlfriend's 404(b) evidence; and (3) not issuing a
subpoena for an important witness, Missy Amy.

6
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The Court can determine on the record that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object and for failing to request notice. In this regard, trial counsel's
performance was deficient because the trial court would have excluded the
evidence of the details underlying the 2012 conviction and the girlfriend's 404(b)
evidence as improper, irrelevant, or too prejudicial. And Mr. Courtney was
prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance; the State had to prove that Mr.
Courtney intended to distribute the drugs found in the car, and this testimony
painted Mr. Courtney as a long-time drug dealer.
Mr. Courtney has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion requesting remand to
supplement the record for his claim that his counsel was ineffective for not
issuing a subpoena for an important witness. Mr. Courtney maintained
throughout his arrest and his trial that the owe sheet was not his and was Missy
Amy's. Further development of the record will show that Mr. Courtney's counsel
knew that Ms. Amy would testify that the owe sheet was hers but failed to
subpoena Ms. Amy, and Ms. Amy did not appear at trial. Mr. Courtney was
prejudiced because the owe sheet was a pivotal piece of evidence for the State to
show that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the drugs found in the car.

7
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Argument
1.

The hial court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Courbtey's 2012
drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show intent.

Utah R. Evid. 404(b) prohibits evidence of bad acts to be used to "prove a
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in conformity with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, the rule

does allow such evidence to be admitted to prove intent. Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Courts engage in a three-pronged analysis to determine the admissibility
of Rule 404(b) evidence. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,r,r 20-24, 993 P.2d 837.
"[T]o be admissible, evidence of prior bad acts must be [1] relevant and [2]
offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, [3] the probative value
of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 13, 328 P.3d 841. But" evidence of prior
bad acts often will yield dual inferences - and thus betray both a permissible
purpose and an improper one." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r 16, 296 P.3d 673.
"That's what makes many rule 404(b) questions so difficult: Evidence of prior
misconduct often presents a jury with both a proper and an improper inference,
and it won't always be easy for the court to differentiate the two inferences or to
limit the impact of the evidence to the purpose permitted under the rule." Id.

8
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VP

Mr. Courtney's arrest in this case occurred in 2010. (R. 280:7.) The State
sought to admit evidence of a conviction of a crime that occurred in 2012, where,
as part of a controlled buy, Mr. Courtney sold methamphetamine to a
confidential informant in a hotel room. (R. 41.) The district court admitted
evidence of the conviction under Rule 404(b) as indicative of intent. (R. 280:1415.)3 But in conducting the three-prong analysis, the district court abused its
discretion when it decided that the probative value of the evidence outweighed
its prejudicial effect.
In determining whether evidence is more prejudicial than probative,
district courts evaluate several factors, including
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse
the jury to overmastering hostility.

"Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) may relate to conduct occurring
either before or after the charged offense." United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281,
1298 (10th Cir. 2011); see State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,r,r 64-65, 256 P.3d 1102
(noting that the state and federal versions of Rule 404(b) are identical and relying
on federal caselaw to answer a 404(b) question).
3
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State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ,r 24, 108 P.3d 730 (quotation omitted). Here, the lack of
similarity of the crimes and the lengthy interval of time between the crimes are
pivotal factors that weigh against admission of the 2012 conviction.

Similarities between the crimes. The 2012 conviction and the crimes charged
in this case are vastly different. In this case, a police officer stopped Mr. Courtney
while he was looking for a child in a parking lot. (R. 280:109-10.) The police
officer asked and Mr. Courtney consented to a search of his person. (R. 280:111.)
The search revealed 60 small Ziploc baggies and an owe sheet. (R. 280:111-12.)
The police officer took Mr. Courtney into custody and drove him to his
girlfriend's apartment. (R. 280:117-18.) Police officers searched the girlfriend's
car, which Mr. Courtney had been driving earlier that day; the officers had to
retrieve keys from the girlfriend to open the car. (R. 280:121-22.) In the car, the
police found a needle and some methamphetamine inside a pouch. (R. 280: 12224.)
In contrast, the 2012 crime involved an undercover operation. (R. 281:20.)

A confidential informant set up a purchase of methamphetamine from a target
individual at a hotel. (R.281:21.) When the undercover officer and the
confidential informant arrived at the hotel, four people were in the room,
including Mr. Courtney and the target individual. (R. 281:22.) The confidential

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

informant sat down at a table with Mr. Courtney and purchased
methamphetamine in a small baggy from Mr. Courtney. (R. 281:25.)
The only similarities between these crimes are the drugmethamphetamine - and presence of at least one small baggy. The State could
not produce any evidence that the baggy was specially marked with a logo or a
decal. (R. 280:12.) The trial court recognized that the baggies were not "unique"
or "remarkable" because "distribution usually involves a baggy." (R. 280:18-19.)
And the court even recognized that the two crimes were not similar. (See R.
280:19-20 (reasoning that the court did not "see enough similarity there to take

the time to go through all the facts [of the 2012 conviction] again").)
Other than the presence of one banal baggy and methamphetamine, no
-other similarities exist between the 2012 conviction and the charged conduct in
this case. The location was different for both crimes - a hotel room and a parking
lot. (Compare R. 280:109-11 with R. 281:22, 25.) In 2012, Mr. Courtney was at a
table with drugs, and here, Mr. Courtney had no drugs on his person. (Compare
R. 280:111-12 with R. 281:22, 25.) In 2012, Mr. Courtney was with a group of
people, and one of them was a target of an undercover operation; here, Mr.
Courtney was alone. (Compare R. 280:109 with R. 281:21-22.) In 2012, the drugs
were in the same room as Mr. Courtney; in this case, the police found the drugs
in a locked car away from where Mr. Courtney was arrested, and Mr. Courtney

11
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no longer had the keys. (Compare R. 280:121-22 with R. 281:25.) The differences
between this case and the 2012 conviction are too significant to be probative to
the jury.

Interval of time that elapsed between the crimes. Also, the interval of time
between the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes is too lengthy. Here, two
years separated the crimes. (R. 280:13.)
In one case, a five-month gap separated the charged crime and the 404(b)
crimes. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 2002). 4 There, the
court determined that the five-month timespan was "of sufficient length to
require a greater similarity between the two events" and that the 404(b) crime
was too dissimilar to be admissible. Id.
Likewise, the two-year gap here required the charged crimes and the 2012
conviction to have greater similarity. And as discussed above, the only
similarities between the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes are the drug and
the presence of a small, nondescript baggy. Otherwise, the circumstances of the
crimes are completely different. One crime occurred in a hotel room and the
other in a parking lot; Mr. Courtney had drugs on him in one crime but not in the
other; many individuals were present in one case, and Mr. Courtney was alone in

Utah courts may refer to federal case law to resolve Rule 404(b) questions
because the text of the state and federal versions of Rule 404(b) is identical. State
v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 1164-65, 256 P.3d 1102.
4
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the other. The vast dissimilarity of the crimes and the two-year time gap render
the evidence of the 2012 conviction inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the
evidence is too prejudicial and insufficiently probative.

Other courts have determined that prior distribution evidence is not admissible
under Rule 404(b) for purposes of showing intent. Other courts have recognized the
hazards of admitting prior drug distribution evidence to show the defendant's
intent to distribute; these courts reason such evidence is too prejudicial and not
sufficiently probative. These courts caution that such evidence is only "probative
of present intent to possess and distribute when the prior distributions were part
of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense."

United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432,443 (6th Cir. 2008). "[T]he fact that a defendant
has intended to possess and distribute drugs in the past does not logically
compel the conclusion that he presently intends to possess and distribute drugs."

Id. at 443-44. "The only way to reach the conclusion that the person currently has
the intent to possess and distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior
convictions for drug distribution is by employing the very kind of reasoning-

i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer-which 404(b) excludes." Id. at444;
see United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[A]dmission of prior
drug crimes to prove intent to commit present drug crimes has become too
routine.")

13
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In this case, the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes were too
dissimilar. The trial court recognized the lack of similarity between the two
events; even though the court allowed the State to introduce evidence of the 2012
conviction, the court boiled the State's argument on similarity down to "look he
sold dope over here and he's in possession of dope over here that we contend he
was intending to sell." (R. 280:20.) The State did not produce any evidence that
the two crimes shared a modus operandi or any common scheme or plan. (R.
280:12, 18-20.) The 2012 conviction simply was not probative of Mr. Courtney's

intent to distribute in this case. Instead, evidence of the 2012 conviction was
overly prejudicial because the jury was at risk of engaging in a "once a drug
dealer, always a drug dealer" type of reasoning that is contrary to Rule 404(b).

See Bell, 516 F.3d at 443.
The jury instructions did not relieve the prejudice to Mr. Courtney. Limiting

jury instructions may alleviate the prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence. See

State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ,I 14,284 P.3d 668. But such instructions are
"not, however, a sure-fire panacea for the prejudice resulting from the needless
admission of [404(b)] evidence." Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. Although the trial
court only admitted the 2012 conviction for the purpose of showing intent, the
trial court instructed the jury that the 2012 conviction could be used to show not
only intent but also know ledge, motive, mistake, and accident. (Compare R.
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280:14-15 with R. 281:110.) Such imprecision in defining for the jury how it
should use character evidence is "troubling," United States v. Stephens, 549 F.3d
459,463 (6th Cir. 2008), and does not alleviate the prejudice to Mr. Courtney.
The admission of the 2012 conviction was not harmless error. Mr. Courtney was

harmed by the trial court's admission of the 2012 conviction. An appellate court
"will not disturb the jury's verdict unless the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. High, 2012 UT
App 180, ,r 41, 282 P.3d 1046 (quotation omitted). "Harmless errors are those
that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. (quotations omitted).
Utah courts have "previously held improper comments concerning prior
convictions to be harmful" and "[i]n close cases, the substantive use of a prior
conviction can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction." State v. Emmett, 839
P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992). And in cases where the evidence against the defendant
was not sufficiently strong or clearly supportive of either party, courts "cannot
say that there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been
different if the jury had not been presented with" prior bad acts evidence. State v.

Leber, 2010 UT App 387, ,r 18, 246 P.3d 163.
Here, the evidence against Mr. Courtney was not overwhelming. The
methamphetamine was not found on him; rather, it was found in his girlfriend's
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car. (R. 280: 122-24.) And when the police found the methamphetamine, the car
was locked and the keys were in the possession of the girlfriend. (R. 280:121-22.)
Mr. Courtney told the police that the baggies found on him were for coin
collecting and that the owe sheet found on him was not his. (R. 280:117-18.)
Essential to the State's assertion that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the
methamphetamine was Mr. Courtney's prior conviction for distribution. Without
the evidence of the 2012 conviction, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
In sum, the 2012 conviction and the crimes in this case are too dissimilar
and too far apart in time; consequently, the probative value of the 2012
conviction did not outweigh the prejudice to Mr. Courtney, and that prejudice
was not harmless and was not alleviated by the imprecise jury instruction. The
trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of the 2012 conviction.
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2.

Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective.
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the

Strickland5 standard, which requires a defendant to prove (1) that counsel's
11

performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."

State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 18,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving
that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
requires [the defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."

State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,r 34,247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted).
Mr. Courtney has three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First,
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness's
testimony that detailed the underlying facts of Mr. Courtney's 2012 conviction.
Second, trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting notice of 404(b) evidence
·w)

and then failing to object to that evidence during the trial. These two claims can
be determined on the record that is presently before this Court.

5

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
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Mr. Courtney's third ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires
remand pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B. In that claim, Mr. Courtney asserts that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena an important witness.
In all instances, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced because his counsel's
failures harmed his ability to show that he had no intent to distribute the drugs
found in his girlfriend's car.
2.1

On the record, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to evidence that detailed the underlying facts of
his 2012 conviction

Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a
witness's testimony that detailed the underlying facts of the 2012 conviction.
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to
testimony, courts consider whether the "objection[] would have been futile," "if
there was a sound tactical basis for not [objecting]," and whether "without
counsel's errors the result would have been more favorable" to the defendant.

State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r,r 33-34, 248 P.3d 984.
In its ruling on the State's notice to admit 404(b) evidence, the trial court
specifically discussed whether the underlying facts of Mr. Courtney's 2012
conviction could be admitted. After determining that that the 2012 conviction
was admissible to show intent, the trial court discussed how the conviction
should be admitted. (R. 280:14-16.) The court told the attorneys that it was
11

concerned" about the State submitting evidence about the controlled buy. (R.
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280:16.) The court questioned the State about the lack of similarity between the
2012 conviction and the charged crimes. (R. 280:17-19.) Then the court stated:
I think with respect to the specific facts in the case of 2012
that we just tried, I think my inclination is to disallow
you getting into all those facts unless, unless there is
similarity, a common plan or scheme. In other words, he
did something in this distribution case that is similar, and
I mean remarkably similar, not just baggy here, baggy
here.

(R. 280:19.) Then the court continued: "[I]f we're just saying look he sold dope
over here and he's in possession of dope over here that we contend he was
intending to sell, I just don't see enough similarity there to take the time to go
through all those facts again." (R. 280:20.)
At trial, the State's witness testified about the 2012 undercover operation.

(R. 281:20-21.) The purpose of the operation was to purchase methamphetamine,
and the witness testified about where the controlled buy occurred and who the
target of the investigation was. (R. 281:21.) Then the witness testified about what
he saw when he arrived at the location of the controlled buy- he saw multiple
individuals in the room, including Mr. Courtney. (R. 281:22.) Then the witness
testified that Mr. Courtney sold methamphetamine. (R. 281:22.) Finally, the
witness testified that a jury found Mr. Courtney guilty of distribution of
methamphetamine, and the State submitted a certified copy of the guilty verdict
to the jury. (R. 281:23.) During this testimony, Mr. Courtney's counsel did not
object, but he did cross-examine the witness. (R. 281:20-25.) And the State did not
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offer any additional evidence to show that the 2012 crime and the charged crimes
were similar.
Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the
witness's testimony of the underlying details of the 2012 conviction when the
trial court had previously stated that it was disinclined to allow such testimony.
Because the trial court had already expressed its unwillingness to let in such
information, the objection would not have been futile. And although an attorney
may properly strategize to not "draw[] the jury's attention to certain facts or
over-emphasiz[e] aspects of the facts," trial counsel did cross-examine the
witness on the facts of the 2012 conviction, so trial counsel's strategy was not to
minimize the impact of the facts underlying the conviction. See State v. Ott, 2010
UT 1, ,r 39 (holding that an attorney was ineffective for failing to object to a
victim impact statement when the attorney could have filed a motion in limine to
exclude the statement and the statement violated precedent).
Furthermore, as argued in Part 1, supra, the evidence of the 2012 conviction
prejudiced Mr. Courtney. The evidence against Mr. Courtney was not strong,
and the 2012 conviction was key to the State proving Mr. Courtney's intent to
distribute. Moreover, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the admission of the facts
underlying the 2012 conviction. Those facts show Mr. Courtney involving
himself with a suspected or known drug dealer, one who was known well
enough to the police to be the target of an undercover operation. (See R. 281:21.)
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Those facts cast Mr. Courtney as a drug dealer who associates with known drug
dealers and makes it far more likely that Mr. Courtney intended to sell the drugs
that were in his girlfriend's car.
The facts underlying the 2012 conviction were more prejudicial to Mr.
Courtney than the mere fact that he had been convicted at one point of drug
distribution. Consequently, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's failure
to object, and without the evidence of the facts underlying the 2012 conviction, it
is reasonably likely that the result of the trial would have been different.
2.2

On the record, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request notice of 404(b) evidence and failing to object to
the 404(b) evidence offered by the girlfriend

Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request notice of
404(b) evidence and then failing to object to that evidence at trial. Courts engage
in a similar analysis when determining whether trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request notice and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to evidence during trial.
For a claim that counsel failed to request notice of 404(b) evidence, the
question before the court is "how the State's ... disclosure would have been
addressed by the ?"ial court had 404(b) notice been requested and whether this
would have given rise to a reasonable probability of a more favorable result for
[the defendant]." State v. Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87, 1 26, 325 P.3d 116. It is the
defendant's request that triggers the notice requirement. See Utah R. Evid.
21
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404(b)(2) (requiring prosecutor to give notice

11
[

o]n request by a defendant in a

criminal case"); see United States v. Aguilar, 59 F. App'x 326, 328 (10th Cir. 2003)
("[A]ccording to Rule 404(b), pretrial notice is required only when the defense
requests such advance notice.").
And as recited above, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure
II

to object requires a court to consider whether the objection[] would have been
futile," "if there was a sound tactical basis for not [objecting]," and whether
"without counsel's errors the result would have been more favorable" to the
defendant. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r,r 33-34.
Taking these two tests together, analyzing an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim for failure to request notice of 404(b) evidence and for failure to
object to that evidence requires a court to determine (1) whether the 404(b)
evidence would have been admissible and (2) whether Mr. Courtney was
prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. In this case, the 404(b) evidence
from Mr. Courtney's girlfriend would have been excluded had trial counsel
requested- and received - notice, and had trial counsel objected to that evidence.
Furthermore, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence,
as it painted him as a long-time drug dealer, and that evidence was pivotal for
the State to prove that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the drugs in the
girlfriend's car.
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A review of the record in this case shows that Mr. Courb.ley's trial counsel
never filed any request for notice of Rule 404(b) evidence; the record is
completely devoid of such a request. 6 See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (requiring
prosecutor to give notice

11
[

o]n request by a defendant in a criminal case"). And

during the State's case-in-chief, the State questioned Mr. Courtney's girlfriend as
follows:
Q:
While you dated Mr. Courtney, were you aware if
he used any controlled substances:
A:
Yes.
Q:
Were you aware if he used methamphetamine?
A:
Yes.
Q:
Did he use methamphetamine?
A:
Yes ....
Q:
Were you present while he-have you ever been
present while he has used methamphetamine?
A:
Yes.
Q:
When you used methamphetamine with him,
how did you obtain the methamphetamine?
A:
Fromhim.
Q:
How did he use methamphetamine?
A:
With a needle ....
Q:
During your relationship and while you were
using methamphetamine with Mr. Courtney, have you
seen him distribute or give methamphetamine to other
people?
A:
Yes.
Have you seen him distribute or give
Q:
methamphetamine to other people for money?
A:
Yes.

6

It appears, however, that the State filed a notice of 404(b) evidence on its
own accord; however, the 404(b) evidence from the girlfriend was not included
in that notice. (See R. 40-42.)
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(R. 280:193-94.) During this line of questioning, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel
never objected.

The 404(b) evidence from the girlfriend was not admissible. If the trial court had
addressed the 404(b) evidence elicited from the girlfriend (either through ruling
on an objection or ruling on the issue after Mr. Courtney received notice from the
State), it would have deemed that evidence inadmissible. As noted above,
admissible "evidence of prior bad acts must be (1] relevant and [2] offered for a
genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, [3] the probative value of the
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 13. The trial court would have had to apply this
test to the evidence as it pertained to the two charges against Mr. Courtney:
possession with intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia.
For possession with intent to distribute charge, the girlfriend's evidence is
improper, irrelevant, and highly prejudicial. The girlfriend testified about Mr.
Courtney's personal use of drugs, including his preference for using a needle. (R.
280:193-94.) But prior personal use of drugs has no relevance on whether Mr.
Courtney intended to distribute the drugs that were found in the car. See United

States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941-42 (8th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that mere possession
offense was minimally probative on whether defendant had intent to distribute);

Haywood, 280 F .3d at 721 ("Haywood's possession of a small quantity of crack
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cocaine for personal use on one occasion, in other words, sheds no light on
whether he intended to distribute crack cocaine in his possession on another

.
") .
occasion....
Furthermore, the girlfriend's testimony about Mr. Courtney distributing
on prior occasions was highly prejudicial. As noted above, courts evaluate
several factors to determine whether evidence is too prejudicial, including "the
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities
between the crimes, [and] the interval of time that has elapsed between the
crimes," among others. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ,I 24 (quotation omitted). The factors
weigh heavily in Mr. Courtney's favor. Here, the strength of the girlfriend's
evidence of Mr. Courtney's prior distribution is weak-it is merely her word.
The girlfriend gives no details about how Mr. Courtney distributed, so gauging
similarities is impossible. Also because of lack of detail, the record is devoid of
information about the interval of time that passed between the time the girlfriend
saw Mr. Courtney distribute and the offenses in this case. Here, "[t]he only way
to reach the conclusion that the person currently has the intent to possess and
distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior ... drug distribution is by
employing the very kind of reasoning-i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug
dealer-which 404(b) excludes." Bell, 516 F.3d at 444. The girlfriend's evidence
cast Mr. Courtney as a long-time drug dealer who had sold drugs before and was
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intending to sell them again. The girlfriend's evidence was either too prejudicial
or entirely irrelevant to the possession with intent to distribute charge and was
therefore inadmissible.
For the possession of drug paraphernalia charge the girlfriend's testimony
about Mr. Courtney's drug distribution was completely irrelevant and
prejudicial. Evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make some fact of
consequence more or less probable, and the evidence must "tend to prove some
fact that is material to the crime charged." Lucero, 2014UT15,117 (quotation
omitted). For possession of drug paraphernalia, the State must prove that Mr.
Courtney was "possess[ing] with intent to use ... drug paraphernalia to ...
store, contain, conceal, inject ... or otherwise introduce a controlled substance
into the human body." Utah Code§ 58-37a-5(1). Whether or not Mr. Courtney
distributed drugs in the past did not tend to prove any material fact in the drug
paraphernalia charge. Furthermore, the girlfriend's drug distribution evidence
was prejudicial: selling drugs and merely possessing drug paraphernalia are
vastly different crimes; there was no information about the time difference
between when the girlfriend saw Mr. Courtney distribute drugs and when the
offenses occurred in this case; and no need exists for the drug distribution
evidence as it pertains to the drug paraphernalia charge. Therefore, the
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girlfriend's evidence about prior distribution as it pertained to the drug
paraphernalia charge was irrelevant and prejudicial and was inadmissible.
Under the 404(b) test, the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible. Had Mr.
Courtney's trial counsel requested notice of 404(b) evidence, the State would
have been required to disclose the girlfriend's testimony. See Utah R. Evid.
404(b). As detailed above, the trial court would have addressed the 404(b) issue
and determined that the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible. Trial counsel's
II

failure to request notice prevented the trial court from carefully consider[ing]
whether [the evidence] is genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character
purpose, or whether it might actually be aimed at sustaining an improper
inference of action in conformity with a person's bad character." Verde, 2012 UT
60, ,r 18.

Had Mr. Courtney's trial counsel objected to the girlfriend's testimony, the
trial court would have also determined that the girlfriend's testimony was
inadmissible under the 404(b) analysis explained above; the objection would not
have been futile. And no sound tactical basis exists for not objecting. The
girlfriend's testimony was highly prejudicial and cast Mr. Courtney has a
perpetual drug dealer. As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated, "[I]n failing to
demand notice of 404(b) evidence, request a pre-trial hearing to determine its
admissibility, [and] enter an objection to the testimony ... defense counsel failed
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to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent
attorney." Fennell v. State, 2015 WY 67, 1 60, 350 P.3d 710. "[W]e cannot conceive
of a reasonable attorney forfeiting the opportunity to prevent the jury from
hearing evidence of his client's prior crimes, wrongs or acts." Id. (quotation
omitted). "We similarly cannot conceive of a reasonable attorney forfeiting the
opportunity to prevent the jury from hearing that his client, who professed his
innocence to the crimes of delivery of cocaine, was a drug dealer." Id. Because
the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), and because no
reasonable trial strategy existed for not requesting notice and for not objecting,
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel performed deficiently.

Mr. Courtney was prejudiced. The admission of the girlfriend's testimony
prejudiced Mr. Courtney. Had her testimony been excluded, Mr. Courtney's trial
would have turned out differently because II other strong evidence" of Mr.
Courtney's guilt did not exist. See Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87,128. Mr. Courtney
was not caught attempting to sell drugs; he was arrested in a parking lot while
he was looking for a neighbor's lost child. (R. 280:109-10.) In fact, Mr. Courtney
had no drugs on him when he was arrested. (R. 280:111-12.) The police found the
methamphetamine in the girlfriend's car that Mr. Courtney had been driving
earlier that day, and the girlfriend had the keys at the time the police arrested
Mr. Courtney. (R. 280:121-22.) The girlfriend's evidence that Mr. Courtney had
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~.·

sold drugs was crucial for the State to prove that Mr. Courtney intended to sell
the drugs in the car. 7
2.3

Mr. Courtney has filed a Rule 23B motion properly alleging his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness

Concurrent with this brief, Mr. Courtney has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B
motion requesting remand . .uRule 23B motions are available only in limited
circumstances, to supplement the record with known facts needed for an
appellant to assert an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal." State v.
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ,r 15,317 P.3d 968 (quotation omitted). A Rule 23B

motion must "(1) contain a nonspeculative allegation of facts that (2) do not fully
appear in the record, which, if true, (3) could support a determination that
counsel's performance was deficient, and (4) demonstrate that the defendant
suffered prejudice as a result." Id. Additionally, Rule 23B motions must "be
accompanied by affidavits ... that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the

In the unlikely event that the State argues that Mr. Courtney's trial counsel
did request notice or that there was some sort of open file arrangement between
the two parties, the girlfriend's 404(b) testimony would still be inadmissible. H
the prosecution fails to give notice after defendant requests notice of 404(b)
evidence, that 404(b) evidence may be inadmissible. United States v. Vega, 188
F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Pretrial notice, or an excuse from the district
court for failing to give notice, is a condition to the admission of other acts
evidence.").
7
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appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P.
23B(b). Mr. Courtney has requested remand to supplement the record on
whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena an important
witness.
Upon remand, the evidence will show that Mr. Courtney's trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness, Missy Amy. During the trial, a
police officer testified that an owe sheet- a list of names and amounts of money
written on a piece of paper-was found on Mr. Courtney. (R. 280:111-12.) The
officer testified that drug dealers typically use owe sheets to keep track of what is
owed to them. (R. 280:112.) The officer said that he asked Mr. Courtney about the
owe sheet, and Mr. Courtney testified that it was not his. (R. 280:117.) Mr.
Courtney testified that the owe sheet was not his and was in fact Missy Amy's.

(R. 281:55-57.) He testified that Ms. Amy had loaned money to others, and he
was using the owe sheet to collect on the debts owed to her. (Id.) Ms. Amy did
not testify at the trial.
Mr. Courtney produced with this brief and with his Rule 23B Motion an
affidavit from his trial counsel. His counsel states that before Mr. Courtney's
trial, trial counsel "met with a potential witness, Missy Amy." (Young Aff.

,r 2.)

According to trial counsel, Ms. Amy told him "that the owe sheet that was found
on Mr. Courtney was hers." (Young Aff.

,r 3.) Moreover, Ms. Amy told trial
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counsel "that she would voluntarily attend Mr. Courtney's trial" so trial counsel
did not subpoena her. (Young Aff.
to testify. (Young Aff.

,r,r 4-5.) But Ms. Amy did not show up at trial

,r 6.)

Mr. Courtney's trial counsel performed deficiently when he failed to

subpoena Ms. Amy. From trial counsel's nonspeculative assertions in his
affidavit, Ms. Amy's testimony would have been helpful to Mr. Courtney; her
testimony would have supported his story that the owe sheet was hers and that
Mr. Courtney was acting on her behalf to secure her debt, not selling drugs. See

State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ,r 28 (holding that under Rule 23B affidavits may be
"from individuals other than the potential witness"). The owe sheet was essential
to the State's argument that Mr. Courtney was intending to distribute drugs. (See
R. 280:116.)
Even though Ms. Amy was an important witness for Mr. Courtney's
defense, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel failed to "take reasonable steps to secure
[her testimony]." See State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291, ,r 30,263 P.3d 469
(reasoning that defense counsel performed deficiently when he failed to
subpoena a helpful witness because he erroneously believed that the State would
call that witness to testify); see also Gregg v. Rockview, 596 F. App'x 72, 77-78 (3d
Cir. 2015) (reasoning that defense counsel performed deficiently when he did not
ensure the attendance of an unreliable key witness through a subpoena). The
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process of obtaining a subpoena is not burdensome or costly. See Utah R. Crim.
P. 14. But because trial counsel erroneously assumed that Ms. Amy would
appear at trial, he failed to take the necessary steps to ensure Ms. Amy's
attendance. Because trial counsel failed to subpoena an important witness,
counsel's performance was deficient.

Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to subpoena Ms.
Amy. In its cross examination of Mr. Courtney, the State questioned Mr.
Courtney why Ms. Amy was not at the trial. (R. 281:72.) And when Mr.
Courtney's wife testified that the owe sheet was Ms. Amy's, the State questioned
her about why Ms. Amy needed Mr. Courtney to collect the money, and the wife
could not definitively say why. (R. 281:43-44.) Ms. Amy's testimony would have
clearly supported Mr. Courtney's story that the owe sheet was not his. (Young
Aff.

,r 3.) And because the owe sheet was key to the State's argument that Mr.

Courtney intended to distribute drugs, it is likely that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.
Because the record does not show evidence of Mr. Courtney's counsel not
subpoenaing Ms. Amy and of Ms. Amy's potential testimony, and because Mr.
Courtney's counsel performed deficiently and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced, this
Court should grant Mr. Courtney a Rule 23B remand so that he can supplement
the record.
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Conclusion

This Court should reverse Mr. Courtney's convictions because the trial
court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of Mr. Courtney's 2012
conviction W1der Rule 404(b). The evidence was highly prejudicial to Mr.
Courtney and not sufficiently probative of his intent to distribute drugs.
Moreover, this Court should reverse Mr. Courtney's convictions because
his trial counsel was ineffective. First, his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the evidence of the underlying facts of the 2012 conviction. Second, his
counsel was ineffective for failing to request notice of 404(b) evidence and then
failing to object to that evidence at trial. That404(b) evidence was inadmissible
and prejudicial to Mr. Courtney. Finally, Mr. Courtney has requested remand to
supplement the record with facts that his counsel failed to subpoena an
important witness and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the absence of that
witness.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2015.

EmilyA~
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
1310 Madera Hills Drive
Bountiful, UT 84010
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Carl Courtney
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES

vs.

Case No: 131900508 FS
Judge:
MICHAEL DIREDA
Date:
Decemb r 30, 2013

CARL MA.CK COURTNEY,
Defendant.

SENTENCING APP
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

PRESENT
Clerk:
zoilab
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R
Defendant
Defendant s Attorney(s): SEAN YOUNG
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole

I

1

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 12, 1968
Audio
Tape Number:
2Dl23013
Tape Count: 10:49-11:02

I

I

·'

DEC 3 o 20t,

CHARGES
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/05/2013 Guilty
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/05/2013 Guilty
HEARING
Defendant present in the custody of Weber County Jail.
Defense counsel requests a deviation from the prison
recommendation.
Defendant addresses the Court.
Court makes prefacing comments.
State addresses the prison recommendation and the defendant's
criminal history.
The Court makes a record regarding the sentence in this case
running consecutively as opposed to concurrently with the
defendant's other sentences.
It is the judgment and sentence of this court that the defendant
serve a term not to exceed Oto 6 months at the Utah State Prison
on count 2.

Printed: 12/30/13 13:18:05
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Case No: 131900508 Date:

Dec 30, 2013

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST
C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
These sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutive
to the sentences imposed in case no. 121900920, 121901670 and·
121901671.

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends the defendant be considered for a substance
abuse treatment such as Con-Quest, Drug Board or some other
program.
Credit is granted for time served.
Date:

/q bo(,::,

Printed: 12/30/13 13:18:05

Page

2

(last)

noo1B5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUMB
Determinative Provisions
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Utah R. Evid. 404
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity
with the character or trait.
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The following
exceptions apply in a criminal case:
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait,
and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut
it;
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer
evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is
admitted, the prosecutor may:
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the
alleged victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor.
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such
evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and
(B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of
pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(c) Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases.
(1) Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of
child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed
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any other acts of child molestation to prove a propensity to commit the crime
charged.
(2) Disclosure. If the prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(3) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed
in relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state,
be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(4) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.

Utah Code§ 58-37-8(1)
(1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;

(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a
position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of
management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or
II, a controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as
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listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;

(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III
or IV, or marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty
of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction
is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of
Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on
his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of
not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.

Utah Code§ 58-37a-5(1)
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this
chapter.
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
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ADDENDUMC
State's Notice of 404(b) Evidence (R. 40-44)
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GAGE H. ARNOLD, UBN. 13035
DEE W. SMITH, UBN. 8688
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASmNGTON BLVD., STE. 230
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: 801.399.8377

;

AUG 2 8 2013

FACSIMILE: 801.399.8304

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF STATE'S INTENT TO
ADMIT 404(B) EVIDENCE AND

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

vs.
Case No. 131900508

CARL MACK COURTNEY,
Defendant.

Judge: Michael D. DiReda

The State, by and through Deputy Weber County Attorney Gage H. Arnold, hereby
notifies the Court and the Defendant of its intent to admit non-character evidence under Rule

404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In this case, the Defendant is charged with Possession of
a Controlled

Substance with Intent to Distribute (Methamphetamine) and Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia. Descriptions of the 404(b) evidence and the State's supporting argument are set

forth below. See Utah R Evid. 404(b)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring the prosecutor to provide
reasonable notice of the general nature of the evidence sought to be admitted at trial).
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Case No. 121901670

On March 20, 2012, agents from the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force (Strike
Force) conducted a buy operation using a confidential infonnant and an W1dercover Strike Force
agent. Agent Jason Vanderwarf, in an undercover capacity, entered into a motel room with the

confidential infonnant and observed the Defendant sell a quantity of suspected
methamphetamine to the confidential informant. The Utah Crime Lab tested the substance and
confirmed it was methamphetamine. The Defendant was tried and convicted of this offense.

Case No. 121901671

On July 27, 2012, members of the Strike Force were conducting a buy/rip operation in
Ogden, Utah when Agent Vanderwarf observed the Defendant outside of a residence. At this
point the Strike Force sought to arrest the Defendant for two prior charges. Agent Vanderwarf
took the Defendant into custody and transported to the Weber County Correctional Facility.
While at the jail, the Defendant was found in possession of methamphetamine in a hidden
compartment of a lock. The Defendant, post-Miranda, made admissions to Strike Force agents.
The substance flash tested positive for amphetamines, and the Utah Crime Lab tested the
substance. Defense counsel should have a copy of this police report.

Case No. 121900920
On January 26. 2012, officers of the Ogden Police Department stopped a vehicle for a

traffic violation. As an officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle, the Defendant threw
Page 2 of6
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a cigarette out of the window. The officer spoke with the Defendant and later verified that he
had an active warrant for his arrest. The officers received consent to search the vehicle and
found suspected methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia inside of a blue bag. After
acknowledgment and waiver his Miranda rights, the Defendant admitted the items inside of the

blue bag were his. The Defendant possessed the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia
within 1,000 feet of a drug free zone. The Utah Crime Lab analyzed the substance and
confmned it is methamphetamine.

ARGUMENT
Generally, "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in confonnity
with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(l) (2013). Crimes, wrongs, or other acts, however,

"may be admissible for another pw-pose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Id. Before the
Court can allow 404(b) evidence to be admitted it must undergo a three-step process.
First, the trial court must ... determine whether the bad acts evidence is being
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically listed
in rule 404(b). In contrast, if the trial court concludes that the bad acts evidence is
being offered only to show the defendant's propensity to commit crime, then it is
inadmissible and must be excluded at that point. If the purpose is deemed proper,
the court must [next] determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of only relevant evidence.
Last, the court must analyze the evidence in light of rule 403 to assess whether its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.
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State v. Marcher, 2009 UT App 262,129, 219 P.3d 75 (omission and alteration in original)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, No. 20090817 (Utah, December

10, 2009).
A. Proper, Noncharacter Purpose
Here, the State intends to admit evidence of the Defendant's two subsequent drug related
offenses to prove the Defendant's intent, knowledge or identity in addition to any absence of
mistake or lack of accident. Id. The State would seek to admit the evidence described above on
rebuttal if the Defendant were to testify to or Defense Counsel were to imply through crossexamination conflicting accounts related to areas allowed under Rule 404(b).

B. Relevancy Under Rule 402
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence explains that relevant evidence is admissible
unless the evidence is irrelevant, or is prohibited under the United States or Utah Constitutions,

Utah statute, or Utah court rules. See Utah R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if ''it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence ... and the

fact is of consequence in detennining the action." Here, the Court should find the drug related
cases are relevant to determining the Defendant's intent, knowledge, or identity. The cases
would also make it more probable that there was an absence of mistake or lack of accident.

C. Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice, et aL
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the Court may "exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more of the following:

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
Page 4 of6
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needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Again, the State would call
rebuttal witnesses related to the cases described above if the Defendant were to testify in a
contradictory fashion or Defense Counsel were to attack through cross examination the State's
case as it pertains to intent, knowledge, or identity, or that a mistake, misunderstanding, or
accident has taken place.

CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, the Court should admit the State's 404(b) evidence against the Defendant
because it is based on a proper, noncharacter purpose, relevant, and the evidence's value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading
the jury, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or needlessly presenting cwnulative evidence.

DATED this

12

}k

day of August, 2013.
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ADDENDUMD
Transcript of the district court's ruling on the
State's 404(b) evidence (R. 280:4-20)
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4

1

P RO C E E D I N GS

2

(The following proceedings are being held in Chambers.)

THE COURT:

3

All right.

Let's turn to the matter

4

State of Utah versus Carl Mack Courtney.

This is 131900508.

5

Counsel are present, Mr. Arnold representing the State and

6

Mr. Young representing the defendant.

7

Mr. Courtney, is currently in the holding cell changing his

8

clothes.

The defendant,

Counsel came back to meet with the Court prior to the

9

10

commencement of jury selection to discuss any loose-end issues

11

that needed to be addressed outside of the presence of the jury

12

so we're on the record in chambers and there are a couple of

13

evidentiary issues that need to be addressed.

14

which is a 404 issue.

15

Mr. Arnold and if you'll make your motion, Mr. Arnold, and

16

then, Mr. Young, I'll hear from you and then, Mr. Arnold, I'll

17

give you one last opportunity to respond.

18

MR. ARNOLD:

The first of

So I'm going to turn the record over to

Okay.

We have filed a notice of an

19

intent to introduce 404(b) evidence at trial.

20

evidence relates to the distribution of methamphetamine from

21

the Value Place Motel/Hotel that Jason Vanderwarf was involved

22

with.

23

go to the 404 -- different 404(b) factors which include proving

24

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

25

identity, absence of mistake or lack of absence, lack of

The 404(b)

We intend to call him tomorrow as a witness.
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This would

5

1

accident, excuse me.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

So just to be clear, let's

3

set up the chronology, the other bad act that you intend to

4

introduce to this jury occurred when?
MR. ARNOLD:

5

It took place in March of 2000

6

believe it was in the spring of 2012.

7

2012, but I can't recall was it early spring?

8

that we've already tried and he was found guilty of.
THE COURT:

9

MR. ARNOLD:

10

I

I can't recall

it was

It's the case

All right.
And then the other evidence which in

11

part isn't -- I mean, we would argue isn't -- there's a part of

12

it that's 404(b) and then there's a part that's just a straight

13

admission where during that incident at the Value Place Motel

14

Mr. Courtney wasn't arrested because it was an undercover

15

operation and he was later arrested at a different drug

16

operation where agents observed him.
They had -- there's kind of a standoff in the street

17

18

between a confidential informant and a drug dealer.

19

Mr. Courtney was there present at the same location.

20

Vanderwarf -- or he was arrested and he was interviewed by

21

Agent Vanderwarf.

22

waived his rights and he then admitted that he sells

23

methamphetamine.

24

get by.

25

Agent

Agent Vanderwarf Mirandized him and he

I believe that the correct term was enough to

THE COURT:

And this was in the prior case that we --
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6

MR. YOUNG:

1

No, that's a case that we haven't filed

2

motions on.

That evidence might be suppressed.

3

could all be suppressed.

4

at all.

I don't think that can come in today

That's a third trial that's forthcoming.
MR. ARNOLD:

5

I mean that

And that's also part of our 404(b)

6

motion or notice I should say.

7

MR. YOUNG:

If you want to get into the facts of that

8

case, they arrested him pursuant to an alleged warrant.

I've

9

since gone back and checked the warrant base and there was no

10

warrant for him, so we'd be filing a motion to suppress that

11

entire case because Detective Vanderwarf says there's a warrant

12

out for him, for his arrest.

13

MR. ARNOLD:

14

MR. YOUNG:

It wasn't a -- sorry.

Go ahead.

I mean, we're talking about a whole third

15

case.

16

They took him into custody based on a warrant which didn't

17

exist so we'll be filing our own motions on that case which I

18

don't think can even be addressed as 404(b) evidence because

19

it's an allegation right now.

20

Now, there's an alleged warrant out for his arrest.

THE COURT:

He hasn't been convicted of it.

Well, I don't think there has to be a

21

conviction, first of all, under 404.

I'm not saying that I

22

by saying that I'm not saying I think it should come in, but

23

I'm just establishing at least that there does not have to be a

24

conviction.

25

crime, wrong or act which is what the rule says.

It's just another bad act.

It could be another
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Let's

7

1

establish

2

MR. ARNOLD:

3

THE COURT:

Can I just address one thing that -Yeah, that's fine, but I want to stay in

4

a sequential way.

I don't want to spin around all over the

5

place and have all these issues overlapping.

6

MR. ARNOLD:

7

THE COURT:

Sure.
So let's talk about the March 2012 or

8

Spring of 2012 incident that occurred that the Court -- that

9

the defendant had a jury trial on recently and was convicted

10

that you now seek to introduce in this case which occurred

11

on --

12
13

MR. ARNOLD:

This case which occurred on

August 26 th , 2010.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

So this case --

15

MR. YOUNG:

March 20 th , 2012.

16

THE COURT:

The case that we are scheduled to try

17

today occurred two years before the case that Mr. Courtney was

18

convicted of most recently and so it isn't as we often hear a

19

prior bad act but rather a subsequent bad act just to be clear

20

again for the benefit of our record.

21

listed all of the other non-character reasons, but you didn't

22

specify which in particular you are focusing on for purposes of

23

this other bad act.

24
25

MR. ARNOLD:

And the specific -- you

It would certainly go -- I mean, this

case is a possession with intent to distribute given the amount
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1

of methamphetamine.

2

sheet in his pocket and also approximately 60 individual

3

baggies and he also had a pretty large pocket knife on him

4

which he admits to Officer Johnson at that time was for

5

protection.

6

crime lab from this 2010 incident.

7

Mr. Courtney was found to have an owe

Nine grams of methamphetamine was tested at the

Agent Johnson's testimony will be that that is a

8

distributable amount of methamphetamine, that on the street

9

it's worth approximately 900 to -- 600 to $900.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. ARNOLD:

We're on the record.

I'm sorry.

So it would go to his intent, and based

12

on the cross-examination, any absence of mistake or lack of

13

accident and any motive that he would have for that

14

methamphetamine.

15

16
17

18

19

THE COURT:

The crime that he was convicted of

previously from Spring of 2012 was what?
MR. ARNOLD:

Distribution of methamphetamine of a

controlled substance, a second-degree felony.
THE COURT:

And so you're arguing that the

20

distribution incident, conviction or otherwise, is properly

21

used in this case to demonstrate?

22

MR. ARNOLD:

23

MR. YOUNG:

24

MR. ARNOLD:

25

MR. YOUNG:

His intent
Mr. Young.
primarily.

And then

His intent to distribute in this case?
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1

MR. ARNOLD:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes.
And just to be clear that because he has

distributed --

4

MR. ARNOLD:

5

THE COURT:

On subsequent occasion.
-- on a subsequent occasion, working

6

backwards you're using that to establish that the reason he was

7

in possession of the drugs that are at issue in the case today

8

was for the purpose of distribution because he has shown that

9

he distributes methamphetamine?

10

MR. ARNOLD:

Yes.

However, you know, there's a

11

proposed jury instruction that the State has filed with the

12

Court indicating that the jurors can only use that evidence for

13

the proper 404(b) factors.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

Response.

15

MR. YOUNG:

I guess I don't understand how that

16

incident subsequent to the case we're trying today shows that

17

he had an intent to distribute in this case.

18

don't understand the argument, your Honor.

19
20

THE COURT:

Is the nine grams in our case today of

methamphetamine?

21

MR. ARNOLD:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ARNOLD:

24

MR. YOUNG:

25

I mean, I just

It is.
So the drug is the same?
Uh-huh.
I guess the facts are so distinguishable

in this case or the prior case convicted of drugs.
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He's in the

10

1

room with the drugs, undercover buy operation.

2

the police pick him up on the street, drive him back to a

3

location where the drugs are found in the car which he is not

4

in possession of.

5

owner and relinquished control of the car with every intent to

6

never enter the car again.

7

owner.

8

9

10
11

In this case

He had turned the keys back over to the

They then go.

He turned the keys back over to the

The police gets consent from the owner

to search the car and finds drugs.

I don't understand how that

again shows the -THE COURT:

I guess the concern I have, Mr. Arnold,

12

is just the two year delay.

I mean, we're not talking about

13

the next month or even six months.

14

years later he's convicted of distribution and so now we're

15

going to use his distribution conviction working backwards two

16

years prior and say that because he was distributing in 2012,

17

that means that the drugs he was in possession of in 2010 were

18

being possessed with intent to distribute?

19

that I have.

We're talking about two

That's the problem

20

I'm not saying that it doesn't bear on that question,

21

but I guess what I'm saying is how does it not really look more

22

or smell more like propensity evidence and less on the

23

non-character reasons?

24

he's a drug dealer.

25

probably possessing with the intent to distribute before

I mean, how does the jury not say oh

Okay.

I get it.

So now that means he was
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1

because he's a drug dealer.

2
3

I mean, isn't that the very propensity evidence that
404 is seeking to keep out?
MR. ARNOLD:

4

It can go to his intent, though.

I

5

mean, the rule is very specific and it says that it goes to his

6

intent on a different occasion.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ARNOLD:

9

THE COURT:
MR. ARNOLD:

10
11

for 404(b) evidence.

12

know.
THE COURT:

13

And you don't think -The rule is what the rule is.
Sure.
And that is one of the proper avenues
There isn't a temporal restraint, you

How far out in terms of temporal

14

proximity do you think you can go before the probative value is

15

substantially outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the

16

evidence?
MR. ARNOLD:

17

Well, if you're going to go a little --

18

I mean 403 is one of the -- obviously the ultimate, I guess,

19

gatekeeper functions that the Court has.

20

probative in this case especially where he's disclaiming

21

ownership.

22

Mr. Courtney claims, although I believe that the

23

understanding is that the witnesses will testify as to

24

otherwise -- that somebody else came and threw a black bag of

25

methamphetamine inside of a car randomly, a car that he had

It's extremely

Part of the evidence that we'll put on is that
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12

1

driven the morning of, a car that there will be testimony, I

2

expect, that where the black bag was sitting on top of his

3

jacket.
It will also go to in the absence of

4
5

misunderstanding as far as attributing, you know, possession to

6

him.

7

his intent and any absence of.

8

THE COURT:

9

I mean, his defense is I didn't do this and so it goes to

Other than the drugs that are the same, I

mean, meaning methamphetamine in both cases, are there any

10

other similarities that bear on this intent?

11

the baggies.

12

them that were common to both cases?

Did they have a decal or some sort of a logo on

MR. ARNOLD:

13

In other words,

I haven't even looked at that.

There

14

were small baggies used in each case.

15

in this 2010 case and he only, you know, was convicted for

16

distributing a small baggy, you know, of the same size in the

17

2012 case.

18
19

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

He had about 60 of them

Mr. Young, additional argument

that you wish to make?
MR. YOUNG:

I think the facts are so distinct in this

21

case (inaudible) it's more prejudicial to the fact that he was

22

convicted on a subsequent case, I think that this case should

23

stand on its own then.

24

he was distributing, I think it should stand by itself.

25

think, like you said, to introduce a prior distribution charge,

If their evidence proves in this case
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1

like you said, jurors will say oh he's a drug dealer.

2

sold again in this case.

3

than probative.

He's

I think it's way more prejudicial

Like I said, the facts are completely different in

4
5

this case.

In the prior case it was a confidential informant

6

undercover agent, an arranged buy.

7

this case.

8

He's not in control of the car.

9

relinquished to the owner of the car who then consents to

There's no arranged buy in

He's found several hundred yards from the car.
The keys are actually

10

search.

11

it's going to be more prejudicial to my client than probative.

12

I think the facts are so distinct in this case that

THE COURT:

So here's how I view it.

I am troubled,

13

I must admit, with the two year delay.

14

the other bad act being a subsequent bad act.

15

established that they don't have to be prior bad acts.

16

troubled by the two year gap, but I don't think that there is

17

case law that suggests that the subsequent bad act must be

18

relatively contemporaneous to the case within which you're

19

seeking to use the other bad act.

20

I'm not troubled with
I think we've
I'm

Having said that, the further away we get I think the

21

less that other bad act evidence is probative.

I mean, you

22

start getting far enough down the line and you could see a

23

scenario in which, I mean, carried out to its logical extremes

24

you've got an other bad act that occurred 30 years before or

25

after the case in which you're seeking to use it and you start
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1

saying okay is it really -- does it really bear on the question

2

of intent?

3

I'm just simply
MR. ARNOLD:

Could I just -- before you make a

4

ruling, one other thing.

Mr. Courtney on this case went to

5

prison for a probation violation so he went into prison.

6

was in prison for an extended period of time and then he hits

7

the streets.

8

actually discuss how long he was in prison which we've excised.

9

That's another issue we need to address, but they discuss that

He

And I can tell you because on the recording they

10

he went to prison for an extended period of time because his

11

probation had been revoked.

12

in 2012 or approximately thereafter and then boom.

13

shortens the --

14

THE COURT:

And so he hits the streets again
So that

Well, I'm not suggesting that the State

15

did something inappropriate by waiting two years to bring it up

16

or something of that nature.

17

how it bears on it, I think temporal proximity does have to be

18

factored in.

19

says permitted uses and it talks about notice in a criminal

20

case and it says this evidence may be admissible for another

21

purpose such as proving motive, opportunity, intent.

22

I'm just saying that as I look at

Now, as I read the rule, obviously 404(b), two

And intent is of particular importance in this

23

particular case because we have the charge that's pending today

24

of position with intent to distribute.

25

language is key because it differentiates between a simple

And that with intent
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1

possession third degree felony and a second-degree felony

2

possession with intent to distribute.
So the jury has to consider for what purpose was he

3

4

possessing the methamphetamine.

5

to use it or was his intent to distribute it?

6

respect the prior distribution conviction, although it relates

7

to an incident that occurred in 2012, two years after this

8

intent to distribute charge is alleged to have occurred, I

9

think the fact that he is or has been convicted of a

Was his intent to possess it,
And in that

10

distribution offense bears on the issue of what his intent was

11

in possessing the methamphetamine in this case.
There is certainly other evidence that will bear on

12
13

that.

The quantity of baggies, the owe sheets, the particular

14

weight of methamphetamine, but I think that the fact that he

15

has been charged and convicted of distribution of

16

methamphetamine also bears on this question of intent.
So I don't find that the evidence is substantially

17
18

more prejudicial than probative.

19

there's no question about it, but it is also extremely

20

probative and so I'm going to allow this particular 404(b)

21

evidence to be introduced in this trial.

22

23

24
25

It is certainly prejudicial,

MR. YOUNG:

And you're discussing the conviction not

THE COURT:

Well, we haven't gotten to that yet.

the -I'm

focusing exclusively on this distribution conviction, the prior
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

1

case that we tried and that's all I'm ruling on at this point.

2

Now, let's talk about the next 404(b) issue.
MR. ARNOLD:

3

Well, we intended to call Jason

4

Vanderwarf to testify and put on the facts of that buy that the

5

Court heard from the last trial.

6

ready.

7

that recording, the jurors can put that, piece that part of the

8

puzzle.

10

We intend to put on those facts because his voice on

THE COURT:

9

We have the same recording

Well, I don't want to spend an inordinate

amount of time re-trying that other case.

11

MR. ARNOLD:

12

THE COURT:

I understand.
And if we're going to spend 30 minutes

13

with the agent from this last case that we tried where he was

14

convicted going in and talking about the buy, playing the

15

tape-recording from the buy and all of that, I guess I'm a

16

little bit concerned about that.
MR. ARNOLD:

17

18

THE COURT:

20

MR. ARNOLD:

21

THE COURT:

23

I mean is it just for how long it will

take?

19

22

I mean

Well -- I guess.
It's the State's case as far as -I understand, but remind me again of what

is said during the exchange that makes this so probative.
MR. ARNOLD:

The fact the arrangement was that they

24

would buy $60 worth of methamphetamine, $60 was given to the

25

CI, Vanderwarf sees Carl Courtney at the table, the CI gives
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1

Carl Courtney $60, the CI then grabs the --

2

MR. YOUNG:

3

MR. ARNOLD:

4

That's the prior case, right?
Yeah.

Well, he's asking about the

facts -- of this.

5

THE COURT:

He wants to introduce evidence of what

6

occurred in the prior case, not just that he was convicted of

7

it for 404 purposes, but he wants to get into the particular

8

details of it.

9

they are really in this case.

That's what I'm trying to understand is why
Why it isn't adequate to simply

10

say he was convicted of distribution and he was arrested and

11

charged and convicted of distribution of meth.

12

the jury need to know?

What more does

I mean telling them all about what occurred unless

13

14

there's a common plan or scheme that you're going to argue that

15

makes the particular facts relevant, I just don't know why it

16

helps.

That's what I'm trying to understand.
MR. ARNOLD:

17

We can do it either way.

I mean Jason

18

Vanderwarf would be called and we can talk about the other

19

incident.

20

it on.

21

of methamphetamine and that would be fine too, you know, I

22

mean, what happens is that his voice is the same on his jail

23

phone call identifying him as Carl Courtney.

24

becomes an issue as far as what Mr. Young wants to do in his

25

defense, if that makes sense?

And I was just going to lay the foundation and put

I mean we can put on a certified copy of distribution

I guess it just
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1

THE COURT:

Mr. Young, do you want to speak to it?

2

MR. YOUNG:

As far as the facts of the prior

3

conviction?
THE COURT:

4

Yeah, getting into exactly what occurred

5

in that case as opposed to just simply letting the jury know

6

that he distributed the methamphetamine in March of 2012.
MR. YOUNG:

7

So we're discussing Agent Vanderwarf's

8

testimony that's going to come forward, how we're going to

9

introduce his testimony?
THE COURT:

10

We're going to go down the road of Agent

11

Vanderwarf explaining yet again what occurred in the prior

12

case.

13

was convicted not --

Well, prior in terms of the case we just tried and he

MR. ARNOLD:

14

Just one other thing.

I mean,

15

Vanderwarf would testify that it was a small baggy that was

16

obtained.

17

THE COURT:

Is there something remarkable about that?

18

MR. ARNOLD:

That he had 60 -- he had 60 of them in

19

20

his pockets when he was arrested in the 2010 case.
THE COURT:

But -- okay.

I mean, I understand he had

21

60 baggies on the 2010 case and when he distributed in 2012 it

22

was a small baggy.

23

MR. ARNOLD:

24

THE COURT:

25

Right.
But, again, unless the baggies have some

similarity to them.
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1

MR. YOUNG:

Aren't all drugs distributed in baggies?

2

THE COURT:

Yeah.

3

unique about those facts.

4

MR. ARNOLD:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

I mean, I'm wondering what's
That doesn't seem remarkable to me.

Okay.
I mean distribution usually involves a

baggy.
MR. ARNOLD:

It does, but I'm just thinking of

8

educating the jury, you know, people who have never, you know,

9

probably purchased drugs or seen drugs in real life, just

10
11

educating them to the fullest extent that I can.
THE COURT:

I think with respect to the specific

12

facts in the case of 2012 that we just tried, I think my

13

inclination is to disallow you getting into all those facts

14

unless, unless there is similarity, a common plan or scheme.

15

In other words, he did something in this distribution case that

16

is similar, and I mean remarkable similar, not just baggy here,

17

baggy here.

18

I mean to me that's just standard operating procedure

19

in the drug distribution arena, but if, for example, the baggy

20

he distributed in the 2012 case had a logo on it and that logo

21

is his signature, right?

22

MR. ARNOLD:

23

THE COURT:

Right.
And he was caught with 60 baggies that

24

have the same logo or signature, then I think that's

25

significant.

If he refers to methamphetamine in a particular
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1

way, you know, he calls it dope or he has some slang term for

2

it and he used the term in the distribution case and also used

3

the term or is overheard using the term with a witness in the

4

other case.

5

MR. ARNOLD:

6

THE COURT:

Right.
To me that's relevant, but if we're just

7

saying look he sold dope over here and he's in possession of

8

dope over here that we contend he was intending to sell, I just

9

don't see enough similarity there to take the time to go

10

through all those facts again.
MR. ARNOLD:

11

Okay.

That's fine.

We would still want

12

to call Jason Vanderwarf for the purpose of introducing the

13

defendant's admissions that he sells methamphetamine.

14

THE COURT:

That he made in the distribution case?

15

MR. YOUNG:

The third one.

17

THE COURT:

Does he make admissions in the case that

18

he was convicted of?

16

19
20
21
22

The third one that's

upcoming.

MR. ARNOLD:

He was never interviewed at that time.

He was subsequently interviewed.
THE COURT:

So what happens --

Following an arrest that Mr. Young may be

challenging?

23

MR. YOUNG:

That's correct.

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. ARNOLD:

I will be challenging.

The whole issue as far as the warrant
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1

Q

Please state your full name and spell it.

2

A

It's Jason Vanderwarf, J-a-s-o-n,

3

V-a-n-d-e-r-w-a-r-f.

4

Q

What do you do for a living?

5

A

I'm a police officer with the Roy City Police

6

Department.

7

Q

8

Okay.

Within the past few years have you been

assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force?

9

A

Yes, I have.

10

Q

And as a part of that team, have you conducted

11

undercover operations?

12

A

Yes, I have.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

With the undercover operations it entails working

Briefly describe what that entails?

15

directly with a confidential informant.

16

confidential informant to introduce us to their suppliers or

17

their dealers to help us get in to be able to purchase drugs

18

from the target that we're looking for.

19
20

Q

Okay.

We'll utilize the

Were you working as a strike force agent on

March 20 th , 2012?

21

A

Yes, I was.

22

Q

And were you working in an undercover capacity that

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And was there an operation that was conducted for the

23

day?
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1

purchase of methamphetamine?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Briefly describe what that operation entailed as far

4
5

as what your understanding of the operation was?
A

I was told that one of our confidential informants

6

was going to arrange the purchase of a small amount of

7

methamphetamine from another individual known as Darryl

8

Dickerson.

9

located on 21 st Street approximately 1100 West 21 Street.

10

The operation was to take place at the Value Mall

We basically arranged $60 worth of methamphetamine.

11

The informant was able to make contact with our initial target

12

by phone.

13

searched prior to the operation for any narcotics on his

14

person.

15

recording device on my person.

16

a recording device on his person.

17

of the Value Place Hotel.

At that point the confidential informant was

I then myself had a recording, visual and audio
That confidential informant had
We then went to·the location

18

Q

Let me just interrupt just one second.

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

It's a hotel and not a mall?

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

Hotel/motel.

24

Q

Did you go up into a hotel room?

25

A

Yes, we did.

It's a hotel.
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2

Okay.

Q

1

Did you enter that hotel room with the

confidential informant?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

When you entered into the hotel room, what did you

5

observe?
A

6

We entered in -- initially I was expecting to see one

7

person that we were supposed to purchase the methamphetamine

8

from.

9

female in the room which caught me off guard.

When we entered, there was actually three males and a
One of the males

10

was sitting on the bed, another male was sitting around a table

11

area inside the room.

12

wandering around in the kitchen where the female was also kind

13

of located in this little kitchenette area.

14

The third male was just kind of

Initially the plan was to purchase the

15

methamphetamine, like I said earlier, from a Darryl Dickerson.

16

He was the individual that we were able to I.D. that was

17

sitting on the bed.

18

in fact, purchased from the defendant, Carl Courtney.

Instead of that the methamphetamine was,

19

Q

Is Mr. Courtney here today?

20

A

Yes, he is.

21

Q

Can you identify him?

22

A

Yes, he's sitting to his attorney's left.

23

Q

Okay.

24
25

At that point once the transaction was

conducted, did you leave?
A

Yes, I did.
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1

Q

Okay.

2

A

Yes, we did.

3

Q

Did it go to a jury verdict?

4

A

Yes, it did.

5

Q

And what was that verdict?

6

A

The verdict was guilty.

7

Q

Guilty of what?

8

A

Of distribution of methamphetamine.
MR. ARNOLD:

9

10

Did we recently have a trial on this?

State would move for admission of a

certified copy of the guilty verdict.

11

MR. YOUNG:

No objection.

12

THE COURT:

What is the exhibit number?

13

MR. ARNOLD:

14

THE COURT:

Nine will be received.

(State's Exhibit No. 9 was received into evidence.)

15

MR. ARNOLD:

16
17

It is nine.

Thank you.

No further questions at this

time.
THE COURT:

18

Cross-examination.

19

CROSS-EXAMINATION

20
21

BY MR. YOUNG:

22

Q

Going back to that event with the undercover buy.

23

There was actually several people in the room as you testified

24

to, correct?

25

A

Yes, sir.
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1

hold on.

While you dated Mr. Courtney, were you aware if he

2
3

Strike that.

used any controlled substances?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Were you aware if he used methamphetamine?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Did he use methamphetamine?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Did you use methamphetamine with him?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Were you present while he -- have you ever been

12

present while he has used methamphetamine?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

When you used methamphetamine with him, how did you

15

obtain the methamphetamine?

16

A

From him.

17

Q

How did he use methamphetamine?

18

A

With a needle.

19

Q

By injecting?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Directing your attention to State's Exhibit 2, the

22

black pouch that you testified about, on that occasion do you

23

recall if you were asked who this black pouch belonged to?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And what did you tell the officers?
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1
2
3

4

A

That it was Carl's.

I had seen him keep his I.D. and

social security card in it a time or two.
Q

Now, speaking of this black pouch, have you seen Mr.

Courtney being in possession of this black pouch?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Have you seen him have methamphetamine inside of that

7

black pouch?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

During your relationship and while you were using

10

methamphetamine with Mr. Courtney, have you seen him distribute

11

or give methamphetamine to other people?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Have you seen him distribute or give methamphetamine

14

to other people for money?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

During the time -- strike that.
Has Mr. Courtney called you from the Weber County

17

18

Jail before?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Called you on multiple occasions?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

To the cell phone number that you had testified

23

previously about?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Just to recap that's (801)686-0608?
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STATE OF UTAH,
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AFFIDAVIT OF SEAN P. YOUNG
vs.
CARL MACK COURTNEY,

App. Case No: 20141171-CA

Defendant/ Appellant.

1.

I was Appellant Carl Courtney's counsel in the district court in the

above-named matter.

2.

Before Mr. Courtney's trial, I met with a potential witness, Missy

3.

Ms. Amy told me that the owe sheet that was found on Mr.

Amy.

Courtney was hers.
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4.

Ms. Amy told me that she would voluntarily attend Mr. Courtney's

5.

Because of Ms. Amy's assertion, I did not subpoena her.

6.

Ms. Amy did not show up during Mr. Courtney's trial and

trial.

consequently did not testify.
Further Affiant saith naught.
~

DATED this

L

day of September 2015.

~~~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

)
COUNTY OF DAVIS
On this Z- day of September 2015 personally appeared before me Emily
Adams who duly acknowledge to me that she prepared the following Affida1.1it
and knows the contents thereof to be correct.
/-~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before)Ile this ; ;i day of Septe!_llber 2015.
/~
-~/

la~-~----

1 '-Notary Publi~

\_,,,Commission # 4' 7 55i 11
My Commission Expires

/~- ,.zii

2.f}ti'

S~ofUtah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

